The Senator and the Constitution: An Interview with Orrin G. Hatch by Collins, Ronald K. L. & Skover, David M.
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly
Volume 16
Number 2 Winter 1989 Article 1
1-1-1989
The Senator and the Constitution: An Interview
with Orrin G. Hatch
Ronald K. L. Collins
David M. Skover
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ronald K. L. Collins and David M. Skover, The Senator and the Constitution: An Interview with Orrin G. Hatch, 16 Hastings Const.
L.Q. 141 (1989).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly/vol16/iss2/1
INTERVIEW
The Senator and the Constitution:
An Interview With Orrin G. Hatcht
by RONALD K. L. COLLINS*
and DAVID M. SKOVER**
Introduction
It would be irresponsible to write a history of the Constitution in the
twentieth century without noting the record of Utah's Republican Sena-
tor, Orrin G. Hatch. To those who have "followed Hatch's career," re-
marked federal judge Howard Markey, "he is Mr. Constitution in the
Senate."1 The fifty-five-year-old lawmaker "has been in the thick of vir-
tually every constitutional battle waged during his [more than a] decade"
in public office.2 Regardless of how one views Hatch's legal, social and
moral philosophy, it cannot be gainsaid that he has played a significant
role in shaping the contours of modem constitutionalism.
That scholars have excluded Senator Hatch from their constitu-
tional study is understandable, but troublesome. The omission is symp-
tomatic of a larger problem: the contemporary academic obsession with
judicial review. Today, constitutional thought is associated exclusively
t @ 1988 Ronald Collins and David Skover. The authors wish to thank their research
assistants-Scott Bader, Jill Bliss, Phillip Foster, Gail Rezer, Scott Mattern, Amy Utterman,
and Loyd Van Williamson-for their diligent and thorough work. The authors express their
gratitude to the University of Puget Sound School of Law for funding the research assistance
required for this article.
* Visiting Professor, American University, School of Law and Temple University,
School of Law. Former law clerk to Justice Hans A Linde, Oregon Supreme Court.
** Visiting Professor, Indiana University (1988-89); Associate Professor, University of
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1. 104 F.R.D. 207, 232 (1985) (introducing Senator Hatch, speaking on federal judicial
review).
2. Effron, Hatch Soars After Rehnquist Victory, LEGAL TIMEs, Sept. 22, 1986, at 1, col.
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with courts. This" "court-positivism" 3 is objectionable for at least two
reasons. First, it leaves a lacuna in the historical record by neglecting the
impact of congressional action on the constitutional process. Second, it
artificially confines analytical and doctrinal attention to only one of the
three coequal constitutional actors.
For these reasons, and to encourage further work in this area,4 we
chose to interview one of the foremost figures in legislative constitution-
alism. We trust that the interview and the accompanying annotations
will introduce readers to the Senator's views and provide them with a
yardstick by which to measure the constitutional and political soundness
of those views.
Background
Elected to the Senate in 1976, Hatch has chaired the influential Con-
stitution Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee and the powerful La-
bor and Human Resources Committee. He has also served as a member
of the Budget Committee and the Select Committee on Intelligence,
among others. In these capacities, he has been one of the leading polit-
ical and intellectual forces aligned with American conservatism.
During his tenure as Chairman of the Constitution Subcommittee,
Hatch was "exposed to more proposals.., to amend the United States
Constitution than any other member of Congress since James Madison
was successful in securing ten amendments to that document." 5 Indeed,
a number of these proposed amendments were launched by the Senator.
For example, he introduced at least three controversial resolutions: the
Human Life Federalism Amendment, 6 the Voluntary Silent Prayer Con-
stitutional Amendment,7 and the Equal Protection Amendment, which
would outlaw affirmative action measures.' In addition; he was an origi-
3. Powell, Book Review, 80 Nw. U.L. REv. 1128, 1136 (1986).
4. See Collins & Skover, The Future of Liberal Legal Scholarship, 87 MICH. L. Rv. 189,
212-16 (1988) (stressing the need for legislative scholarship).
5. 104 F.R.D. 207, 233 (1985) (statement by Hatch).
6. See infra notes 39, 41.
7. In relevant part, the proposed amendment provided:
Nothing in this Constitution shall be construed to prohibit individual or group silent
prayer or reflection in public schools. Neither the United States nor any State shall
require any person to participate in such prayer or reflection, nor shall they en-
courage any particular form of prayer or reflection.
First introduced in 1982 (as S.J. Res. 199), 128 CONG. REc. 10,371-72 (1982), the proposed
amendment was reintroduced in 1985. See Constitutional Amendment Relating to School
Prayer: Hearings on S.J.. Res 2 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1985).
8. According to this proposed amendment (S.J. Res. 200),
nal co-sponsor of the Balanced Budget Amendment,9 the Line-Item Veto
Amendment,'" and an amendment calling for the direct election of the
President and Vice-President."
The former Utah lawyer also called for hearings on other proposed
constitutional amendments, some of which he strongly opposed. During
the ninety-eighth Congress, Hatch moderated the hearings on the impact
of the Equal Rights Amendment.' In the wake of Immigration and
Neither the United States nor any State shall make or enforce any law which
makes distinctions on account of race, color, or national origin
... [Or] establish or maintain, or require or permit any private individual or
enterprise... to establish or maintain, goals, quotas, timetables, ratios, or numerical
objectives which make distinctions on account of race, color, or national origin.
126 CONG. REc. 23,772-84 (1980).
In 1981, Senator Hatch argued that the Supreme Court's interpretations of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 amounted to "government-mandated discrimination ... causing disrup-
tions all over America in favor of the 'preferred' classes. Where in the Constitution do we find
preferred classes?" AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, WHOM Do JUDGES REPRESENT? 8
(June 1, 1981 conference); see Hatch, Bork and Equal Protection, Wash. Times, Oct. 2, 1987, at
Fl, col. 1 (describing affirmative action as "difficult to reconcile with the Constitution's lan-
guage guaranteeing equal protection to every person").
9. In pertinent part, the proposed amendment provided:
Prior to each fiscal year, the Congress shall adopt a statement of receipts and outlays
for that year in which total outlays are not greater than total receipts. The Congress
may amend such statement provided revised outlays are not greater than revised
receipts. Whenever three-fifths of the whole number of both Houses shall deem it
necessary, Congress in such statement may provide for a specific excess of outlays
over receipts by a vote directed solely to that subject. The Congress and the Presi-
dent shall ensure, pursuant to legislation or through exercise of their powers under
the first and second articles, that actual outlays do not exceed the outlays set forth in
such statement.
Balanced Budget Constitutional Amendment" Hearings on S Res. 13 Before the Subcomm.
on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-5 (1985); see
also infra note 79.
10. This proposed amendment provided:
The President may disapprove any item of appropriation in any Act or joint resolu-
tion, except any item of appropriation for the legislative branch or the judicial branch
of the Government. If an Act or joint resolution is approved by the President, any
item of appropriation contained therein which is not disapproved shall become law.
The President shall return with his objections any item of appropriation disapproved
to the House in which the Act or joint resolution containing such item originated.
The Congress may, in the manner prescribed under section 7 of article I for Acts
disapproved by the President, reconsider any item of appropriation disapproved
under this article.
Line-Item Veto: Hearings on SJ Rea 178 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the
Senate Comm on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (1984).
11. This amendment would abolish the office of elector of the President and Vice-Presi-
dent of the United States and authorize their direct election by the "people of the several
States" and the District of Columbia. The full text of the proposed amendment is contained in
The Electoral College and Direct Election: Hearings on S Res 18 Before the Subcomm. on
the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 21-25 (1977).
12. See The Impact of the Equal Rights Amendment: Hearings on S.J. Ren 10 Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st & 2d
Sess. (1983-84) (Pts I & 2). For Senator Hatch's views on the matter, see 0. HATCH, THE
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Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 13 he presided over hearings concerning
a constitutional amendment to restore the legislative veto. 14 Apart from
any proposed constitutional amendments, the one-time bishop of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints directed hearings on reli-
gious liberty15 and "fetal pain.' 6
On the statutory front, Hatch has championed the conservative
cause by attempting to shape constitutional principles and policy. Con-
sistent with his proposed amendments, he spearheaded a campaign to
establish procedures for a future constitutional convention. 17 Hatch's ef-
forts to "reform" civil rights and civil liberties laws were legion, though
largely unsuccessful. He introduced or cosponsored an anti-busing bill,' 8
an amendment to federal voting rights law requiring plaintiffs to prove
intentional discrimination, 19 an act to limit municipal liability for civil
rights violations,20 an anti-abortion funding measure,2' a bail reform
act,22 a pro-death penalty law," an anti-exclusionary rule measure,24 an
EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT: MYTHS AND REALmES (1983) [hereinafter MYTHS]; Hatch,
The Equal Rights Amendment Extension" A CriiicalAnalysis, 2 HARv. J. L. & PuB. PoL'Y 19
(1979).
13. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
14. See Constitutional Amendment to Restore Legislative Veto: Hearings on S.J. Res. 135
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1984).
15. See Issues in Religious Liberty: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
16. See Fetal Pain: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
17. See S. 1710, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. 22,945-50 (1979); S. 817, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. 5505 (1981); 129 CONG. REc. 764-70 (1983); S. 40, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REc. 107 (1985); see also Cohodas, Constitutional Convention
Procedures Bill Snagged in Senate Judiciary Panel, 39 CONG. Q. 2449 (1981) (Hatch describes
main principle of his repeated bills as ensuring that Congress could only call convention and
would not be "in a position to undermine the convention process."); Hatch, Foreword, The
Amendment Process & Limited Constitutional Conventions, 2 BENCHMARK 63 (1986).
18. See, eg., The 14th Amendment and School Busing: Hearings on S. 1760 Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 398-
404 (1981) (withdrawing inferior federal court jurisdiction to order racial assignment or bus-
ing); 61 Cong. Dig. 150-56 (1982).
19. For a comprehensive statement of the Senator's views on the matter, see 128 CONG.
REc. 13,110-64 (1982).
20. See S. 436, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. 2171-75 (1985) (providing a "spe-
cial defense to the liability of political subdivisions of States").
21. See Abortion Funding Restriction Act: Hearings on S. 522 Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1985) (amending
Civil Rights Act of 1964 to prohibit use of federal funds for abortions).
22. See, eg., 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (Supp. III 1982 & Supp. IV 1986) ("Bail Reform Act of
1984") (requiring courts to detain, prior to trial, arrestees charged with certain felonies if the
government can show evidence that release conditions are dangerous), upheld in United States
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anti-polygraph bill, 25 a congressional reapportionment proposal,26 and a
firearm owners' protection act,27 among others. Assuming an adversarial
posture, he piloted a successful attack on liberal amendments to the 1968
Fair Housing Act.2"
In matters concerning the federal judiciary, Orrin Hatch has earned
a reputation as a formidable player. From the Reagan administration's
perspective, his advocacy proved helpful in the Sandra Day O'Connor29
and Antonin Scalia3" nomination proceedings, crucial in the William
Rehnquist31 and Daniel Manion32 hearings, and valiant in the Robert
Bork33 confirmation battle.34 In addition to defending these and other
Reagan judicial nominees, he has argued against the rejection of nomi-
nees on the basis of political, judicial and economic philosophies.35
v. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. 2095 (1987); see also S. REP. No. 147, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) ("Bail
Reform Act of 1983").
23. See, ag, S. REP. No. 143, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (report accompanying S. 114,
which proposed procedures for imposition of death sentence for certain federal crimes); see
also 103 CONG. REc. 2209-11 (1984) (remarks of Senator Hatch in support of S. 1765, a modi-
fied version of S. 114).
24. See infra note 55.
25. See S. 1815, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REc. 30, 054 (1985).
26. See 131 CONG. REc. 30,311 (1985) (S. 1734, adjusting population count to exclude
illegal aliens).
27. See S. 49, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. Rnc. 16,984 (1985).
28. See Tolchin, Conservative Republican Senators Filibuster on Housing Bias Measure, N.
Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1980, at B17, col. 5; Tolchin, Bill to Strengthen Fair Housing Act Killed as
Senate Cloture Vote Fails, N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1980, at B8, col. 3.
29. See Nomination of Sandra Day O'Connor Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
30. See Nomination of Antonin Scalia: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
31. See Nomination of William Rehnquist Hearings Before the Senate CommL on the Ju-
diciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); see also Greenhouse, Senators Hear Familiar Speeches As
the Debate on Rehnquist Opens, N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1986, at 10, col. 1; Effron, Hatch Soars
After Rehnquist Victory, supra note 2.
32. See Nomination of Daniel Manion: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
33. See Nomination of Robert Bork- Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); see also Hatch, Bork and Equal Protection, supra note 8, at Fl,
col. 1.
34. Hatch was also Edwin Meese's "chief defender during Meese's... tumultuous confir-
mation experience in 1985." Effron, supra note 2, at 8, col. 4.
35. See Hatch, Book Review, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1347, 1350, 1353 (1986) (reviewing L.
TmrE, GOD SAVE Tins HONORABLE COuRT (1985)) (opposing "ideological inquisitions by
the Senate" and advancing "considerations militating against using political criteria in the
confirmation process"); see also AMERiCAN ENTERPRisE INsrTruTE, supra note 8, at 24; cf.
H. ScnwAaz, PACKING TnE COURTs 83-89, 201-204 (1988) (seventeen "judicial philosophy"
questions prepared by Senators Hatch, Denton and East and submitted to Joseph H. Rodri-
quez, nominee for the U.S. District Court). Judiciary Committee Chairman Senator Strom
Thurmond challenged his colleagues' inquiries. Ultimately, Senator Hatch voted to confirm
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Hatch's standing as a stalwart conservative constitutionalist was
such that by 1986 his name had surfaced on President Reagan's "short
list" of possible Supreme Court nominees.16 Were it not for the Wash-
ington Post's story on the "emoluments" issue,37 the Senate may have
assessed the qualifications of one of its own for the post left open in 1987
by the retirement of Justice Lewis Powell.
38
The interview that follows was held on Friday, December 19, 1986,
in Senator Hatch's office in Washington, D.C. Then Minority Staff Di-
rector of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, Mr.
Randall Rader, now a federal judge, was also present. But for scheduling
the interview, we had no prior contact with Senator Hatch or any mem-
ber of his staff.
The interview was tape-recorded and transcribed. Minor stylistic
changes were made to suit the interview to a written format. In addition,
we annotated the interview to explain, expand or qualify the positions
articulated by the Senator. The footnotes are drawn from the Senator's
published and unpublished statements made prior and subsequent to the
interview. In all that we have done, we have attempted to be as objective
as possible-this, even though our personal viewpoints often differ from
the Senator's.
We offer this interview as an impressionistic portrait of Orrin
Hatch's constitutional profile.
Abortion and the Constitution
QUEsTION: Do you believe that fetuses should be recognized as
legal persons within the meaning of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the United States Constitution?
HATCH: No. 39 For over 150 years, the states were free to regulate
Rodriquez, even though earlier he had voted against Court of Appeals nominees Patricia Wald
and Abner Mikva. Id at 54.
36. See Brandt, Reagan May Turn To Sen. Hatch as Next Supreme Court Nominee, Wash.
Times, Nov. 20, 1986, at F4, col. 5; Effron, supra note 2, at 8, col. 1; Justice Hatch?, NEws-
WEEK, Sept. 22, 1986, at 10. During the 1988 presidential election, Hatch remained an out-
spoken critic of liberal values. See, e.g., Hatch Hits Democrats, Denies It, Wash. Post, Sept. 2,
1988, at A4, col.6.
37. Kamen, Could Judges' Pay Raise Keep Hatch Off Court?, Wash. Post, June 5, 1987, at
A25, col. 1 (U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 in effect prohibits Senator from serving as judicial
officer if salary for the position has been increased during the Senator's term); see also Mathe-
son, Jr., Hatch Downed, NAT'L L. J., July 13, 1987, at 13.
38. Of course, after the 1988 Senatorial election, the "emoluments" barrier was lifted,
until any further Supreme Court pay raises.
39. In his critique of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), Senator Hatch argued:
The Court's holding that the Fourteenth Amendment could not possibly have been
intended to protect the unborn may conflict with the plain meaning of the word
(Vol. 16:141
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abortion and other domestic policies. They were free to permit or punish
"person," and quite possibly, with the intent of the Fourteenth Amendment. In or-
der to decide whether an individual is protected under the Fourteenth Amendment,
Congressman John Bingham of Ohio, its principal Framer, declared in 1867, "the
only question to be asked of the creature claiming its protection is this: Is he a
man?" The Court's observations notwithstanding, this question has consistently
been answered in the affmative by American courts and legislatures with regard to
the unborn.
128 CONG. REc., 23,537-41 (1982); see also id at 23,545 n. 39, (quoting Gorby, The Right to
an Abortion, the Scope of Fourteenth Amendment 'Personhood, 'and the Supreme Court's Birth
Requirement, 1979 S. ILL. U.L.J. 1, 24 ("There is nothing in the function of the fourteenth
amendment to suggest that its scope or purpose is to protect only the born.").
As early as 1977 and as late as 1981, Senator Hatch introduced and supported constitu-
tional amendments consistent with the view that fetuses should be recognized as persons
within the protection of the supreme law. See, eg., 123 CONG. REc. 31,438 (1977) (introduc-
tion of S.J. Res. 84, human life amendment); 127 CONG. REc. 848-84 (1981) (supporting S.J.
Res. 17, Senator Garn's human life amendment).
The Senator's critique of Roe, quoted above, accompanied a statement in support of the
proposed Human Life Federalism Amendment, S.J. Res. 110, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG.
REc. 1381 (1981), which "would overturn Roe" and "establish concurrent authority to legis-
late in the State and Federal Governments on the subject of abortion." 128 CONG. Rnc. 23,533
(1982). Then Senate Judiciary Committee member John P. East (R-NC) took exception to the
Hatch constitutional amendment because it "does not address the fundamental problem of the
right to life of the unborn and whether they should be protected under the 14th Amendment."
Still other anti-abortion activists argued the Hatch amendment doesn't go far enough. See
Miller, Two Competing 'Pro-Life' Measures Split the Anti-Abortion Lobby, NAT'L J., Mar. 20,
1982, at 511, 512; see also Anti-Abortion Groups Repudiate Hatch Plan, N.Y. Times, Sept. 24,
1981, at 14, col. 1 (72 anti-abortion groups repudiating Hatch Human Life Federalism
Amendment and calling on President Reagan to propose amendment defining fetuses as per-
sons).
In response to criticisms of his Human Life Federalism Amendment, Senator Hatch
stated:
Let me be clear about what I am saying. I personally believe that abortion is an all or
nothing issue. I am irreconcilably opposed to abortion. I believe that abortion in-
volves the taking of a human life. It is morally, ethically, and I believe constitution-
ally wrong. Should this amendment become part of the Constitution, I would be
among those seeking the most restricted State laws with respect to abortion. When a
greater consensus exists in this country on the repugnance of abortion-which con-
sensus I believe will be promoted by this amendment-I will be among those seeking
a direct constitutional prohibition on abortion.
129 CONG. REC. 674 (1983) (introducing S.J. Res. 3); accord 129 CONG. REc. 89082 (daily ed.
June 27, 1983).
According to a congressional aide, Senator Hatch declined to add his name to the list of
some 110 members of Congress who signed one of two anti-abortion amicus briefs in Webster
v. Reproductive Health Serv., 851 F.2d 1071 (8th Cir. 1988), prob. juri, noted, 109 S. Ct. 780
(1989) (No. 88-605), because he did not have adequate time to review them and because he
typically does not sign amicus briefs. Telephone interview with Mark Dissler (Mar. 14, 1989).
One of these briefs, offered by Professor Albert Blaustein, argues that fetuses should be recog-
nized as "persons" under the Fourteenth Amendment. The other, filed by Professor Jules
Gerard, contends that the regulation of abortion should be returned to federal and state
lawmakers.
In July, 1985, Senator Hatch did, however, sign the armicus brief prepared by Professor
Robert Destrow on behalf of Senator Gordon Humphrey (R-NH) and 81 other members of
Congress. The anti-abortion brief, submitted in Thornburgh v. Am. College of Obstetricians,
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abortion. Then, in 1973, in Roe v. Wade,4° [the Court changed that]. I
believe the case was incorrectly decided. Be that as it may, the Supreme
Court created a national right to abortion. I think it would also be incor-
rect to conclude that 150 years of history were erroneous, and the states
did not have authority over that time to regulate abortions because the
fetus was in fact protected by the Due Process Clause. The constitu-
tional amendment that I proposed would have overturned Roe; it would
have permitted the people in the states to govern themselves democrati-
cally on these issues. 1 The states would have been free, as they were
prior to 1973, to regulate or refrain from regulating abortion.42
QUESTION: On that note, assume hypothetically that Roe v. Wade
were overruled, and thereafter a dozen or more states reinstated its hold-
ing as a matter of their own state law. What, if any, national restrictions
should and/or could be imposed on such states in order to safeguard fetal
life?
HATCH: Congress' powers would not be altered by the reversal of
Roe v. Wade. It would still have authority under the Commerce Clause,
for instance, and might choose to regulate the interstate commerce ship-
476 U.S. 747 (1986). argued, among other things, that for constitutional purposes "under some
circumstances... the unborn have some type of 'personhood' status." Brief amicus curiae of
U.S. Sen. Gordon J. Humphrey (R-N.H.), U.S. Sen. Orrin G. Hatch (R-Utah), U.S. Rep.
Christopher H. Smith (R-N.J.), U.S. Rep. Alan B. Mullohan (D-W.Va.), and certain other
members of the Congress of the United States in support of Appellants at 24, Thornburgh v.
Am. College of Obstetricians, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (No. 84-495).
40. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
41. Between 1981 and 1987, Senator Hatch repeatedly introduced a constitutional amend-
ment that provided:
A right to abortion is not secured by this Constitution. The Congress and the several
States shall have the concurrent power to restrict and prohibit abortions: Provided,
That a law of a State which is more restrictive than a law of Congress shall govern.
See 127 CONG. REc. 21,381 (1981) (S.J. Res. 110); 129 CONG. REc. 671 (1983) (S.1. Res. 3);
131 CONG. REc. 294 (1985) (S.J. Res. 5); 137 CONG. REc. S1270 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1987) (S.J.
Res. 36).
42. See, e.g., 129 CONG. REc. S9088 (daily ed. June 27, 1983) (emphasizing the states'
"plenary authority" over abortion regulation); 129 CONG. REc. S9281 (daily ed. June 28,
1983) ("[S]tates would be free to deal with abortion policy as they see fit. Abortion would be
among the many subjects not specifically delegated to the Federal Government by the Consti-
tution and thus left to the States and the people themselves.").
Though stressing the states' rights component of his Human Life Federalism Amend-
ment, Senator Hatch also acknowledged that "[C]ongress would be empowered to establish
minimum national standards with respect to abortion, if it chose." 129 CONG. REc. 675
(1983) (introducing S.J. Res. 3). Several months later, the Senator, again commenting on $5.
Res. 3, added: "It would not grant Congress any power to directly restrict or prohibit abor-
tion. Congress would retain its authority under its enumerated constitutional powers to regu-
late interstate commerce and other areas that might tangentially touch upon abortion." 129
CONG. RFc. S9083 (daily ed. June 27, 1983); accord id. at S9122; see infra note 43.
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ment of abortifacients.43 In fact, a statute44 to that effect, unenforceable
under Roe, is currently on the books. Congress could also deny the use
of federal funds to provide abortion services, as has been accomplished
by the Hyde Amendment,45 and as it now does with regard to most fed-
eral health programs.'
QUESTION: Assume that Roe were overruled, that twenty states
provided substantial numbers of abortions, and that people from other
states traveled interstate to obtain abortions. As a matter of public pol-
icy, Senator, would you favor, say, economic or other congressional re-
straints on those states?
HATCH: I have always supported the HydeAmendment, and that
surely is a form of economic restraint. I think that, no matter how you
cut it, abortion-indiscriminate abortion, or abortion on demand-is a
very detrimental thing to society as a whole. I would prefer to limit
abortion. We found in our hearings47 from pro-abortion statistics that-
of approximately one million-and-a-half to two million abortions a year,
only three percent-really only one-and-a-half percent, let's double it to
3 per-cent-are required to save the life of a mother, for rape, incest, or
serious deformity. That means that ninety-seven percent of all abortions
are basically for reasons of convenience.
QUESTION: If we understand you correctly, if Roe were overruled
and some states began to provide large numbers of abortions, as a matter
43. In an exchange with Senator Robert Packwood (R-OR), Senator Hatch recognized
the broad scope of Congress' "residual" powers to regulate abortion through the Commerce
Clause: "The Federal Government... has utilized the commerce power to justify any Federal
law it wants to create.... There is no doubt in my mind that under the commerce power,
Congress could hypothetically preempt almost all regulatory powers left to the States." 129
CoNG. Rc. S9123 (daily ed. June 27, 1983) (commenting on S.J. Res. 3); see also supra note
42.
44. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1461, 1462 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
45. The first Hyde Amendment, which was upheld in Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297
(1980), was set out in Pub. L. No. 94-439, § 3209, 90 Stat. 1418, 1434 (1976).
"Could Congress use its authority to dispense money, the spending clause, to require
publicly funded medical schools to ban abortion, to require publicly funded hospitals to ban
abortions except for the life of the mother, to require any State receiving welfare funds to ban
abortion?" In response to this question, Senator Hatch noted: "Congress has enjoyed broad
spending authority. Based on... current case law, I would expect that a congressional spend-
ing limitation intended to ban abortions could be upheld by the Supreme Court." 129 CONG.
REc. S9283 (daily ed. June 28, 1983) (commenting on the potential effects of the Human Life
Federalism Amendment).
46. Apart from the hypothetical, at this point in the interview, Senator Hatch added:
"But, it would not be within the Congress' power to outlaw abortion per se because of the Roe
decision."
47. See generally Constitutional Amendments Relating to Abortion: Hearings on S.J. Re%
17, S.J Res 18, S.J. Res 19, and S.J. Res. 110 .efore the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
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of policy you would not oppose having Congress place certain economic
and other restraints on the states. Is that correct?
HATCH: I would have to look at the proposal, but I would prefer a
constitutional amendment. I have always preferred that. Some of my
colleagues would like to exercise Congress' right to withhold jurisdiction
under Article III. I think under certain circumstances that article could
be utilized, but I think that option is very unwise and unwarranted, ex-
cept in the most stringent of circumstances where basic fundamental lib-
erties are involved.4" Some would say that the fetus' right to life is such a
basic fundamental liberty.
QUESTION: In July of 1981, you voted in subcommittee for Senate
Bill 158 (Senator Helms' human life statute). Thereafter, you expressed
serious constitutional reservations about that statute.4 9 Would you elab-
orate on the nature of your reservations?
HATCH: The Human Life Bill would have declared that the word
"person" in the Due Process Clause [includes] "fetuses." In other
words, Congress would have, by mere statute, changed the words of the
Constitution-in effect, including the words "and fetuses" after "per-
sons" in the Due Process Clause.
I believe the Constitution can only be changed by the procedures
enumerated in Article V, and I know that the proponents of the bill, and
even the Supreme Court in Katzenbach v. Morgan,5" suggested that Sec-
tion Five of the Fourteenth Amendment gave Congress additional power
with respect to defining rights. Section Five says that Congress is em-
powered to enforce the amendment. The power to enforce is not the
power to define the substantive content of the guarantees. In that sense, I
disagree with the Human Life Bill and the Katzenbach decision."1 (And,
48. See infra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
49. See Cohodas, Anti-Abortion BillAdvances in Senate Panel, CONG. Q., July 11, 1981, at
1253.
50. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
51. On an earlier occasion, Senator Hatch explained in his interpretation ofKatzenbach v.
Morgan his view on Congress' authority to enforce, independent of judicial construction, the
dictates of the Fourteenth Amendment:
In Katzenbach, the Court made clear that [Sec. 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment]
does not merely give Congress the authority to enforce those rights which are already
understood to exist in the basic provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, but gives
the authority to define those rights as well. In light of the vagueness of the Four-
teenth Amendment, this gives Congress the expansive authority to define "due pro-
cess" or "equal protection" and obligate the States to abide by these definitions.
Referring to the proposed Equal Rights Amendment, Senator Hatch thereafter added by way
of analogy:
The same would be true about the "enforcement" clause of the ERA. Congress
would not be limited to "enforcing" rights against the States that had already been
established by the courts, but would be able to define, in the first place, such rights
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I would note that I was joined in that opinion by a pretty eminent group
of agreeable people-Robert Bork, William Van Alstyne, Laurence
Tribe, Archibald Cox, and others. Sometimes it is a little uncomfortable
being in that august a group.)
But I voted for the Human Life Bill in the subcommittee because I
felt that the entire Senate should decide this important constitutional is-
sue, and declare, once and for all, that Congress was not empowered to
change by statute the meaning of the Constitution, and that the only
acceptable way of changing the meaning of the Constitution would be by
an Article V procedure.
Congressional Authority to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment
QUESTION: Senator, do you believe that the Miranda provision of
Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 196852 is
constitutional?
HATCH: In 1968, shortly after Miranda imposed strict warning re-
quirements on police officers to ensure that pretrial statements were in
fact truly voluntary, the Congress (some would say in a fit of pique) en-
acted an alternative set of procedures that conflict with the Supreme
Court dictum. Although these procedures remain on the books, the Jus-
tice Department has never tried to use them, as far as I know."3 Instead,
it has chosen to comply with the more rigorous Miranda procedures.
This, in my opinion, was a wise decision by the Justice Department to
avoid any particular interbranch conflict. I do not differ with that. If, as
I suspect, your question really goes to whether the Congress has to abide
by the constitutional interpretations of the Supreme Court, I would have
to say yes.
QUESTION: If you were in the Senate in 1968, would you have voted
for this bill?
and require State laws to be consistent. Congress could effectively nullify provisions
of the Constitution which confer primary power upon the States.
0. Hatch, MYTHS, supra note 12, at 28 (1983) (emphasis in original).
52. 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a)(1968). This section purports to "repeal," at least in federal prose-
cutions, the rule of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), by providing that a confession
"shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given"; see Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J.
ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURES 572-74 (6th ed. 1986).
53. Cf United States v. Crocker, 510 F.2d 1129 (10th Cir. 1975). Subsequent to this
interview, the Office of Legal Policy of the U.S. Department of Justice issued a report, pre-
pared by Stephen Markman (a former Judiciary Committee top aide to Hatch), recommending
that "the Department of Justice should seek to persuade the Supreme Court to abrogate or
overrule the decision in Miranda. The most promising line of attack involves reliance on the
statute enacted in 1968 to achieve that end. 18 U.S.C. § 3501." Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE &
J. ISRAEL, supra note 52, at 110 (6th ed. Supp. 1988).
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HATCH: Congress may not, by a majority vote, decide to change the
meaning of the Constitution. That would violate Article V, which says
that the Constitution can only be changed in accordance with its set pro-
cedures or by amendment. As I have already mentioned, I believe the
abortion case was wrongly decided, and that the orderly way to proceed
to change that ruling is to propose, pass, and ratify a constitutional
amendment, which, of course, I tried to do.54 This is the only way, it
seems to me, to avoid immeasurable chaos and confrontation in our sys-
tem of government.
I add, however, that you must carefully read some Supreme Court
decisions to discern whether or not they are based on the Constitution or
whether they invite congressional solution." Some cases do. Grove
54. In early spring of 1981, Senator Hatch supported S. 158, a statute proposed by Sena-
tor John P. East (R-NC), which declared that human life "shall be deemed to exist from
conception." When asked by a New York Times reporter, "Do you think that a Congressional
statute is the proper approach to this issue?" Hatch replied:
Well, I continue to prefer a constitutional amendment to deal with the Roe v. Wade
decision. I am not yet entirely comfortable with S. 158, the statutory approach, but I
do believe that a credible case can be made for it.... Section 5 of the 14th Amend-
ment... gives Congress the power to enforce by appropriate legislation the provi-
sions of the 14th Amendment. S. 158 would make the Congressional finding that
human life shall be deemed to exist from the point of conception, without regard to
race, age, health, defect or condition of dependency. It would make the further find-
ing that "a person," for purposes of the due process guarantees of the 14th Amend-
ment, would include all human life.
As Congressmen Take Up the Abortion Issue, Two Sides Debate: When Does Life Begin?" N.Y.
Times, April 19, 1981, § 4, at 16, col. 1.
Later in the same year, however, Senator Hatch withdrew his support for such statutory
measures, specifically rejecting S. 158 in favor his proposed constitutional amendment, SJ.
Res. 110, supra note 41. Apparently, he opposed S. 158 on two grounds: he doubted its con-
stitutionality and its chances for political success. See Cohodas, ConstitutionalAmendment To
Permit Ban on Abortion Approved by Senate Panel, CONG. Q., Dec. 19, 1981, at 2526; Roberts,
Catholic Bishops For Amendment Allowing States to Ban Abortions," N. Y. Times, Nov. 6,
1981, at Al, col. 2; accord 129 CONG. REC. 674 (1983) (Hatch remarks reintroducing Human
Life Federalism Amendment (S. 498), noting lack of political consensus on constitutional rec-
ognition of a fetus as a person).
55. Early in 1983, Senator Hatch introduced S. 283, a bill that would have eliminated and
established an alternative to the exclusionary rule in federal criminal proceedings. Speaking
(for himself and Senators Thurmond and DeConcini) in favor of the measure, Senator Hatch
declared:
Mr. President, today I am introducing a bill to eliminate and establish an alternative
to the exclusionary rule in federal criminal proceedings. The exclusionary rule is a
judicial policy mandating the inadmissibility of evidence obtained in violation of cer-
tain fourth amendment rights....
Although the fourth amendment triggers its judicial application, the exclusion-
ary rule is not a part of the Constitution, but a court-made rule of evidence that was
not adopted for Federal courts until 1914 .... [citing Rader, Legislating a Remedy
for the Fourth Amendment, 23 S. TEX. L. J. 585 (1982).]
[.. The exclusionary rule instead is custom made to deter the prosecutor, not
those law enforcement officers guilty of committing the illegal acts .... The rule's
adamant demand for a perfect trial is without constitutional foundation. In criminal
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City5 6 is a perfect illustration. There, the Court basically said, "you can
change." We've tried to do that in subsequent Congresses. 7
The Miranda case, I believe, suggests that other alternatives may
protect voluntariness as well. Consequently, I would want to study the
legal merits a little more closely before deciding conclusively whether
Miranda was grounded in the Constitution in a manner that forecloses
Congressional action by statute.
prosecutions, the sixth amendment maintains that the accused be given a speedy and
public trial, not necessarily a perfect trial....
... In recent Supreme Court decisions concerning the exclusionary rule, Justices
have continued to echo the fact, which was first introduced in Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25 (1949), that the rule is "judicially created and one which Congress might
negate." The bill I propose today is in response both to the cries of these Justices of
the Supreme Court and to our fellow Americans, who are increasingly becoming
victims of violent criminal acts.
My bill, comprised of two major provisions, would eliminate the exclusionary
rule, thus permitting evidence not [to] be held inadmissible, when obtained in viola-
tion of fourth amendment rights by Federal law enforcement officials, in a Federal
criminal trial. Also, my bill would allow for redress for innocent persons of fourth
amendment violations. Federal law enforcement officials who violate fourth amend-
ment rights will not be afforded protection by this bill; but they will instead b[e]
required to answer for their actions [in civil tort suits]. Both provisions are needed.
129 CONG. REc. 1119-21 (1983); see also 130 CONG. REc. 2099-2101 (1984) (proposed alterna-
tive to federal exclusionary rule); 131 CONG. REc. 90-93 (1985) (same). None of these meas-
ures was adopted.
56. Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984) (federal anti-discrimination laws gov-
erning educational institutions apply only to specific program or department receiving federal
funds).
57. After this interview, Congress overrode President Reagan's veto of a bill which ex-
pands the reach of federal civil rights laws to override the effects of the restrictive Grove City
ruling. Senator Hatch opposed the override. See Molotsky, House and Senate Vote to Override
Reagan on Rights, N.Y. Times., Mar. 23, 1988, at Al, col. 6.
Prior to this, Senator Hatch opposed congressional attempts to reverse the Grove City
decision. See Cohen, Who Controls the Senate? NAT'L J., 552 (1985); Blinken, Down the
Hatch, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 26, 1984, at 14.
For statements of Senator Hatch's views on the Grove City controversy, see Hatch, The
Myths and Realities of the Proposed Civil Rights Act, 9 HARv. J. L. & PuB. PoL'y 1, 5-6 (1986)
("What is most wrong with [the proposed Civil Rights Act of 1984 or 1985] is that it would
incorporate a dangerous notion of discrimination into the law of our nation.... What it
ultimately represents is the institutionalization of federal affimative action policy."); 64 CONG.
DIG. 13 (1985); 135 CONG. REc. 2448 (1985); 130 CONG. RPc. S12,514-19 (daily ed. Oct. 1,
1984) (50 questions submitted by Sen. Hatch concerning proposed Grove City legislation); 130
CONG. REc. S12,174-75 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1984) ("I do not really believe it is a civil rights
issue. I believe it is an issue of governmental power: the Federal Government, vis-a-vis State
and local governments, as well as private industry and nonprofit corporations."); 130 CONG.
REc. S12,152, 12,153 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1984) ("The issues involved are monumental issues.
Not only civil rights, which I think most everybody in the Senate would want to advance, but
the issues of separation of powers, federalism, and governmental power and authority."); 130
CONG. REc. S12,145-57 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1984); 130 CONG. Rlc. 59853, 9854 (daily ed.
Aug. 7, 1984) (proposing an act to reverse Grove City, characterized as "far more narrow"
than alternative proposals).
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QUESTION: Are you saying that you may not have voted for the
Omnibus Crime Control Act?
HATCH: That's right. I might not have. If I thought that the mea-
sure was an attempt by the legislature to change a constitutional ruling
by a majority vote, when Article V provides for the amendment process
as the only effective means of making a constitutional change, that would
have great influence on my vote.58
Legislative Review of Constitutional Questions
QUESTION: Would you endorse a variation on the original proposal
for a Council of Revision if it were composed of legislators only and if its
powers were limited to reviewing proposed federal legislation? What we
are interested in is whether Congress currently has adequate procedures
to review proposed legislation for constitutional deficiencies before
passage.
HATCH: I would say no. I do not think we need a supercommittee
to assess the constitutionality of legislation. I disagree with Mr. Madison
[who supported Edmund Randolph's proposal], and I think his col-
leagues disagreed with him at the time. Every member is bound by his
oath and duty to assess every piece of legislation for constitutionality. It
is the duty, then, of the judiciary, it seems to me, to perform this consti-
tutional review function. By and large, although I disagree from time to
time, I think the judiciary has done an incredible job. 9
58. Senator Hatch has indicated, however, that section five of the Fourteenth Amendment
grants authority to Congress to restrict the jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts and might
be used to override errant Supreme Court constitutional interpretations. For example, in the
context of public school busing, he noted:
My legislation [S. 37, public school busing] is also based on section 5 of the 14th
amendment....
[This section places] Congress in a leading role in the selection of remedies for
violations of the 14th amendment. Therefore, it is entirely proper for Congress to
determine that assignment of students to public schools on the basis of race is not an
appropriate or effective remedy for unconstitutional segregation. The manner in
which Congress would choose under this bill to limit this counterproductive remedy,
if indeed this could be called a remedy at all, is to withdraw the jurisdiction of lower
Federal courts to issue orders that would assign students to schools on the basis of
race.
131 CONG. REc. 101, 103 (1985).
59. Speaking at a 1981 conference sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute, Sena-
tor Hatch defined "judicial activism":
[It is] the tendency of courts... to solve problems rather than to resolve grievances,
a tendency to use plaintiffs as vehicles for imposing far reaching orders applying to
classes of individuals, a tendency to impose broad affirmative action obligations upon
society, a tendency to loosen jurisdictional requisites so that they can grant more
standing in particular suits, and of course, the tendency to impose the judicial branch
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Moreover, I think (your proposal] might have been a constitutional
flaw, too, had it been put into effect. I say this because it would give a
few members from a few states a veto power over the will of the entire
Congress with respect to constitutional interpretation. I think that result
would be disastrous, especially to the smaller states. Now, Article V pro-
vides that no state may be "deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate,"
and this scheme may well give some states more suffrage than others. In
any event, having been here ten years, I believe that the constitutional
system works remarkably well, even under present circumstances. I
.would not want to engage in any fancy scheme [such as the Council of
Revision proposal] to fix a system that shows no signs of breakage.
Congressional Power to Limit Federal Court Jurisdiction
QUESTION: You commented earlier that you were not in complete
agreement with the idea of Congress using its powers to curb federal
court jurisdiction. Under what circumstances, then, may Congress re-
strict the jurisdiction, first, of the Supreme Court, and, second, of the
lower federal courts?
HATCH: I think that restricting the jurisdiction of lower federal
courts is a relatively easy thing to do for Congress. When it comes to the
Supreme Court and the decision of basic fundamental rights and liber-
ties, I think that is a more difficult thing to do. In that context, the
Article III procedure restricting the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
may very well not apply."o In fact, I do not believe it does.61 Yet, I think
upon other institutions in the manner of an administrator with continuing oversight
responsibilities.
That is what our courts have been doing, and that is how I define "judicial
activism."
AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, supra note 8, at 29.
60. See The Constitution: That Delicate Balance, (WNET, NY, television broadcast Nov.
13, 1984, transcript no. 109, at 8) (Hatch: "I think we have the power to limit the jurisdiction
of the courts within certain parameters. If it comes to the constitutional rights that must be
preserved, I'm not sure Congress can extend its power that far. It may try, and it may succeed,
because the court itself as you know is not immune to political thought and theory.").
61. In the fall of 1985, Senator Hatch, commenting on proposed legislation to withdraw
Supreme Court jurisdiction over public school prayer cases, said:
[The Senate has a judgment to make concerning the legal sufficiency of the Supreme
Court's interpretations of the first amendment relative to prayer in public
schools.... Although the Constitution vests in Congress some authority to make
exceptions in the appellate jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court, that limited power
must be used very judiciously. This leads us to the crucial question presented by S.
47, specifically, whether Congress would be wise to do what it has some authority to
do, namely withdraw Supreme Court jurisdiction over the subject matter of "volun-
tary prayer." ... I have severe reservations about using in this instance the authority
which the Constitution implies should be employed only in exceptional circum-
stances.... The better means to which I refer is... a constitutional amendment
permitting silent prayer or meditation in public schools.
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there is a wide b6dy of law where it very well could apply.62
[This leads to my next point.] Even though Congress may have the
power [to limit the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court], it probably would
be very unwise to exercise that power given the separation of powers
doctrine. I think it should only be exercised under the most stringent of
circumstances. For instance, I would have utilized it if I had been living
at the time of the Dred Scott63 decision to restrict [either the Court's
jurisdiction over or the Court's enforcement of that decision]." That is
why it has not been used, and I think most members of Congress realize
the distinction [based on exceptional circumstances].
Some members of Congress do not believe that the Congress can
restrict the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, period. I think that is
bunk. I think Congress can. But whether it should or not is the big ques-
tion. Heroic constitutionalists, even though they may agree with the pur-
pose for which, say, Senator Helms wants to restrict the jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court, are going to stand up and say, "I'm sorry, but I can't
do that because I think it's an unwise thing to do under the
circumstances."
131 CONG. REc. 23,199 (1985).
62. For one summary of the Senator's constitutional and policy views on this subject,
consider the following:
The language of article III itself seems to counsel Congress to use caution with
regard to the Supreme Court's jurisdiction....
[Section 2 of article III] already seems to imply some limitations in Congress'
authority. Congress could not, for instance, withdraw all appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court because in that instance it would not be making an exception at all.
Nor could Congress make a sweeping withdrawal of all jurisdiction to review cases
dealing with the Bill of Rights. As the word "exception" implies, Congress' power
relative to the entire corpus of the Court's appellate jurisdiction is limited to making
rare and narrow diversions from the normal course of permitting the Court to hear
appeals.
... Although Congress possesses a power, prudence often counsels against its
use .... Congress has been appropriately reticent to wield its article III, section 2
power. That reticence should only be overridden when the dislocation associated
with a focused restructuring of court remedies is far outweighed by the dislocations
occasioned by an errant judicial policy. ... This requires that we make clear delinea-
tions between legal issues and policy considerations. As a matter of law, the Consti-
tution grants Congress some authority to regulate Federal court jurisdiction, but as a
matter of policy, this public school prayer issue does not, in my view, warrant the
exercise of this powerful check on the Court.
Id. at S23,199-200 (commenting on proposed legislation to withdraw Supreme Court jurisdic-
tion over public school prayer cases).
63. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
64. The bracketed phrases reflect our understanding of the Senator's meaning. In order to
avoid any misinterpretation, however, we supply the actual wording of his response. Immedi-
ately after the word "circumstances," Senator Hatch added: "For instance, I would have uti-
lized it if I had been living at the time of the Dred Scott decision to restrict the Court with
regard to what it had propounded in Dred Scott. And there may have been a few other deci-
sions, but darn few of them."
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QUESTION: Senator, by way of clarification, would you adhere to
the view that the rights and liberties that are fundamental, for which
jurisdiction could not be curbed, would be those that are textually identi-
fied in the Bill of Rights? Would you limit it in that fashion?
HATCH: I do not know that you could limit it in that fashion, but
there would come some ragged-edged decisions. During the first 200
years of our constitutional history, there have been very few instances in
which the Article III authority to restrict has been utilized. I would like
to see the next 200 years be about the same.
QUESTION: You have addressed your comments primarily to the
U.S. Supreme Court. We understand you to believe that Congress both
could and perhaps should have greater latitude with the lower courts, the
federal district courts and the Courts of Appeals. Is that a fair
statement?
HATCH: I think Congress can definitely restrict the jurisdiction of
the lower courts. Whether it should or not is always a question.65 The
Norris-La Guardia Act66 is a perfect illustration. The lower courts were
administering injunctions all the time, and Congress just plain restricted
the rights and powers to do that.
QUESTION: So, you would have a different standard for the district
courts, even in fundamental rights cases, than you would for the U.S.
Supreme Court?
HATCH: I think the Constitution has a different standard.6 7 Any-
thing we do on the Judiciary Committee that passes through the Con-
gress generally places some restriction on the jurisdiction of the lower
courts. You see very little restriction with regard to the Supreme Court,
because the Congress has to recognize that the doctrine of separate but
equal powers has to be maintained for this Constitution to work. There-
fore, the Supreme Court has established its system of judicial review and
it should be respected for it.
65. Senator Hatch himself has introduced measures to restrict the jurisdiction of inferior
federal courts in several civil rights areas. See, eg., 127 CONG. REc. 3208 (1981) (S. 583,
abortion); 129 CONG. REc. 802 (1983) (S. 139, public school busing); 131 CONG. REC. 101
(1985) (S. 37, public school busing).
66. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1932), upheld in Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323
(1938).
67. At this point, Mr. Randall Rader commented: "Whenever you change a diversity
amount you're actually changing the jurisdiction of a lower court."
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"Plain Meaning" and the Public Accounts Clause
QUESTION: In light of the text of the Public Accounts Clause, 68 do
you think that Congress is required to publish accounts of all appropria-
tions, for example, those of the Central Intelligence Agency?
HATCH: No, I do not. The Constitution declares that a regular
statement of "all public Money" should be published "from time to
time." The Framers were well aware of the dangers of disclosing na-
tional security information, so they included Article I, Section Five,
69
which provides that Congress can refuse to publish such portions of the
Congressional Record that do, in fact, require secrecy. Even such an ar-
dent libertarian as Patrick Henry [conceded the need for secrecy].7° The
Supreme Court has consistently maintained that this particular provision
is satisfied by Congress' general oversight of the budget in its decision to
grant unspecified sums, for example, to the CIA.
QUESTION: Senator, we are not concerned with any issue of jus-
ticiability, but with constitutional decisionmaking by the Congress. By
way of a follow-up question, do we understand you correctly to hold
that, although the text [of Article I, Section Seven] admits of no national
security exception, there is one implicit in the Constitution?
HATCH: I think there is. Once again, I suspect your question asks
whether this provision-"all public Money"-ought to be construed ac-
cording to its plain meaning. The plain meaning is really the whole an-
swer. I think we really must seek the original meaning. I debated [the
68. U. S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 7 provides: "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury,
but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of
the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time."
69. U. S. CONST. art I, § 5, cl. 3 provides: "Each House shall keep a Journal of its Pro-
ceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judg-
ment require Secrecy."
70. The Senator quoted Patrick Henry as saying: "Such transactions as relate to the mili-
tary operations or the affairs of great consequence the immediate promulgation of which might
defeat the interests of the community, I would not wish to be published."
71. Senator Hatch's understanding of interpretation by "original meaning" is more specif-
ically developed in a speech delivered shortly before this interview:
This brings into focus the key question, namely what standards are to govern
judges when they execute their responsibility of protecting all constitutional rights-
to borrow from our first amendment example, the rights to speak on political subjects
as well as the rights to maintain order in courtrooms or to protect national security.
I would posit that the only place that judges can look for a resolution of these
dilemmas is the Constitution itself, not the subjective intent of a few of its authors
(those authors sometimes disagree), not the subjective intent of its ratifiers (historical
records are sometimes incomplete), and certainly not the subjective intent of contem-
porary judges. Indeed, a judge should not look to subjective intents at all, but at the
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original intent issue] with Professor Laurence Tribe,72 and, in this case, it
would be hard to conceive that the Framers really meant to require the
disclosure of information that could jeopardize their own objective,
namely, that the Congress or the Constitution must provide for the com-
mon defense. I think the provision speaks for itself, and I think it is
implicit enough.
"Plain Meaning" and Executive Authority
QUESTION: Senator, do you believe that the President has the con-
stitutional power under Article II to require federal governmental em-
ployees who work with classified documents to submit self-authored
materials for prepublication review? In this regard, consider President
Reagan's National Security Decision Directive 84.73
HATCH: This prepublication review procedure is, for the most part,
contractual. Federal employees who are likely to handle sensitive mate-
rial sign a contract whereby they agree to abide by the review procedures.
The courts have consistently upheld these contracts because of the fiduci-
ary responsibilities these employees undertake with regard to national
secrets. The executive branch, however, can only protect properly classi-
fied material through this type of procedure. The President's classifica-
tion authority springs primarily from his Article II, Section One
responsibilities as chief executive, and from his powers as commander-in-
chief under Article II, Section Two. This entails taking steps necessary
on occasion to provide for the common defense, including reasonable
measures to protect our national security secrets.
QUESTION: Under Article II, then, would the President have the
authority to compel federal government employees to submit to prepubli-
cation review regardless of whether there were contractual provisions to
this effect?
original meaning of the words of the Constitution. On this point, the framers would
agree.
This process entails ascertaining the general understanding of the words of the
Constitution that prevailed in 1787 or 1868 or whenever the particular portion of the
Constitution was adopted by a supermajoritarian process.
Opening Statement of Senator Orrin G. Hatch, Atlantic Monthly Debate (Dec. 11, 1986) (un-
published speech on file with authors; emphasis in original); see also 0. HATCH, MYTHS, supra
riote 12, at 27.
72. The debate, entitled "The Debate on Original Intent in the Constitution," occurred on
December 11, 1986, at the Kennedy School of Harvard University.
73. See S. KATZ, GOVERNMENT DECISIONS WITHOuT DEMOCRACY 31-34, 107 (1987).
For a statement of Senator Hatch's perspectives on the related but more comprehensive issues
of the respective powers of the Executive and the Congress in the creation and administration
of foreign policy, see Cooper, Hatch, Rostow, & Tigar, What The Constitution Means by Exec-
utive Power, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 165, 197-204 (1988).
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HATCH: Yes, he would have the authority.
QUESTION: Furthermore, do you believe that such executive direc-
tives are constitutional under the First Amendment, as you read it?
HATCH: As you realize, the First Amendment is not absolute. Per-
haps the most famous exception is the "clear and present danger" test.
Without knowing for sure whether any particular person's knowledge or
the release of any particular document might create a clear and present
danger to our national security, I still postulate that the directive would
generally fit within that exception.
QUESTION: So you think [these prepublication directives] are
constitutional?
HATCH: I think so.
QUESTION: The text of the First Amendment is singularly ad-
dressed to Congress. In your opinion, should it be interpreted to apply to
the executive branch, as well? If so, why?
HATCH: I think it does apply. I mean, I do not know that I can
answer that, but I think it does.74
The Incorporation Doctrine
QUESTION: Mindful of considerations of text and historical intent,
and regardless of decisional law, do you believe that the First Amend-
ment should be applied to the states?
HATCH: The answer has to be yes. Since 1925, in the famous Gitlow
case,75 it has been established that the First Amendment has been incor-
porated into the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. It would
be late in the game today, as I view it, to reconsider that settled doctrine.
74. Concerning the question of how much interpretive deference should be given to the
plain meaning of the constitutional text, consider the following statement by the Senator:
Article II, Section 1 states that a person must have "attained to the age of 35
years" in order to be eligible to be President. This sounds easy to interpret as a
numerical cut-off. Yet a leading non-interpretivist scholar opined that this language
should be viewed as a vague recognition of the importance of maturity and could be
replaced by "fifty years or thirty years without impairing the integrity of the constitu-
tional structure." In other words, 35 does not mean 35, but some undefined notion
of maturity. Can you imagine the Supreme Court deciding whether an individual
elected President by the People of the United States is sufficiently mature to serve?
In another sense, this is an intellectually honest opinion by this non-interpre-
tivist because it demonstrates that if courts are free to stray from the original mean-
ing of the Bill of Rights and other Amendments to protect minority rights, they are
also free to depart from the purpose and meaning of the structural provisions of the
Constitution. In either case, I would suggest that a court would be improperly devi-
ating from our fundamental law.
Opening Statement, supra note 71, at 4 (citing Tushnet, A Note on the Revival of Textualism in
Constitutional Theory, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 683, 687 (1985)).
75. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
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To my knowledge, not a single member of the present Supreme Court
would question the doctrine of incorporation, including its application to
the First Amendment.
Now, in terms of history, John Marshall did state in Barron v. Balti-
more76 that the Bill of Rights applied only to the federal government.
The 39th Congress, however, enacted the Fourteenth Amendment, and
the states ratified that amendment. I am aware of the argument that the
text of the Due Process Clause only requires procedural fairness, and
that the First Amendment is substantive in its application or in its pro-
tections. Nonetheless, the larger context of the Fourteenth Amendment
and subsequent Supreme Court interpretations suggest that first amend-
ment liberties are so fundamental that they would have to be protected
against any deprivation regardless of [the Fourteenth Amendment's] pro-
cedural character. That is a fair statement of where we are.
QUESTION: Senator, what are your views about the Second Amend-
ment and its applicability to the states?
HATCH: As you know, the incorporation doctrine is selective. Not
all of the guarantees in the Bill of Rights have been held implicit in the
"concept of ordered liberty" and thus incorporated into the Due Process
Clause. The Second Amendment has not been incorporated.
QUESTION: Do you agree with that position?
HATCH: There is an explanation for this. The Second Amendment
has not been considered [to embody] an individual right to bear arms,
but a collective right to the security supplied by the state militia. Under
this view of the Second Amendment, it is understandable that the Court
would not place it alongside the First Amendment and the other individ-
ual rights that have been considered fundamental. Moreover, the Court
has had few, if any, opportunities to consider a second amendment case,
because the militia argument [has prevailed] in the lower courts. If, as I
have suggested, the Second Amendment is read to protect a reasonable
individual's right to bear arms-if it is read that broadly, and it could
very well be-then that right would probably warrant incorporation.
QUESTION: Which of these readings do you endorse?
HATCH: Basically, I believe that there should be a fundamental in-
dividual right to bear arms.
QUESTION: So you would see the broader construction of the Sec-
ond Amendment as the preferable one?
HATCH: Yes, I would. Sure.
QUESTION: Regardless of what the federal courts have said?
76. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
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HATCH: Yes. However, I am not sure that, if I were on the Court, I
would do that.77 I am just saying that, personally, I believe that the
Second Amendment's [protection extends beyond] the militia argument.
I have written on that subject.78
QUESTION: Do you personally believe, as well, that the First
Amendment should be incorporated?
HATCH: At this point, yes.
QUESTION: In light of what you have said, what about the Fifth
Amendment's self-incrimination and double jeopardy provisions? In
your view, should they. be applicable to the states?
HATCH: Yes. In adopting the Due Process Clause, the nation
clearly intended that states would be forbidden to deprive persons of
liberty without due process. These are precisely those kinds of protec-
tions. It seems to me that we are to be protected against any form of
state deprivation. So, I think [that these fifth amendment guarantees]
should apply to the states.
Closing Comments
QUESTION: Senator, is there anything you would like to add by way
of summary or supplementary comment considering the issues we have
discussed? Perhaps, in retrospect, you might like to add something? Or
tell us what you believe to be particularly troublesome in American con-
stitutional law today?
HATCH: Well, I think some of the more difficult decisions that the
Supreme Court is going to have to rule upon in the future are going to
involve the high deficits and budget problems of the United States. And
I believe it is going to take some very, very erudite thinking to resolve
77. Speaking on the floor of the Senate in 1983, Senator Hatch addressed the second
amendment issue:
In my studies as an attorney and as a U.S. Senator, I have constantly been
amazed by the indifference or even hostility shown to the Second Amendment by
courts, legislatures, and commentators. James Madison- would be startled to hear
that his recogntion of a right to keep and bear arm's... has since been construed in
but a single, and most ambiguous, Supreme Court decision .... [I]n all too many
instances, courts or commentators have sought, for reasons only tangentially related
to constitutional history, to construe this right out of existence.... [Tihe Framers
used the term "Militia" to relate to every citizen capable of bearing arms.... I have
long regarded the right of Americans to keep and bear arms as one of the most vital
rights recognized in the Bill of Rights.
129 CONG. Ric. S3675-76 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1983) (remarks in support of a measure restruc-
turing federal firearms laws, co-sponsored by Senator Hatch).
78. See The Constitution: That Delicate Balance, supra note 60, at 12 (Hatch: "I do not
believe that either the state or the federal government has-should have the right to take away
people's right to bear arms."); see also supra notes 27 & 77.
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those problems.79 The courts must recognize that Congress has some
responsibility, too. Maybe, the courts are going to have to be [just as]
cognizant of Congress' co-equal power as Congress is of the courts'. It
seems to me that the Framers never contemplated that we would have
continually unbalanced budgets. One day, that is going to be one of the
biggest issues that has ever come before the Supreme Court.
QUESTION: Do you think the Court is institutionally competent to
adjudicate a balanced-budget amendment?
HATCH: The Court is not competent to adjudicate a number of is-
sues, but it always seems to do it.8°
COLLINS/SKOVER: Thank you, Senator.
79. As early as 1979, Senator Hatch became a leading force for the promotion of a consti-
tutional amendment requiring a balanced budget. See 125 CONG. Rnc. 13,864-66 (1979) (in-
troducing S.J. Res. 86). In 1982, he cosponsored another such amendment, S.J. Res. 58, "the
first proposed amendment on this subject to be reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee
.... " 128 CONG. Rnc. 15,812 (1982) (text of amendment and commentary at 15,812-31); see
also 132 CONG. Rnc. S2222 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1986) (cosponsoring S.J. Res. 225, another
balanced-budget amendment); id. at S2153-68 (statement in support of S.J. Res. 225).
80. Senator Hatch discussed the role of the federal courts in enforcing the provisions of a
proposed balanced budget amendment (S.J. Res. 58):
While my own confidence in the idea of judicial self-restraint has been sharply
diminished in recent years, I believe nevertheless that traditional judicial and consti-
tutional conceptions ofjusticiability, and standing, as well as the idea of what consti-
tutes a "political question" are best reserved to non-judicial branches of the
Government, suffice to insure that the courts will not involve themselves, as a normal
matter, in reviewing the operations of the budget process....
... [While the committee has chosen not to prohibit judicial review altogether
of "cases or controversies" arising in the context of the proposed amendment-in the
.belief that the most serious and unambiguous violations of its provisions ought to be
subject to external check.., it nevertheless is expected that the amendment will be
largely self-enforcing and self-monitoring.
128 CONG.,REC. 15,812, 15,828, 15,829 (1982).
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